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Jones Act Seamen
FL EET DOCTRINE APP LIES TO
SH ORE-BASED RIGG ER
WORKING ON BARG E
Asserti ng the fleet docti ne, where p er
manent assi gnment to group of vessels
under common ownership can be
shown, al lows a ri gger worki ng on
floati ng p latforms to acqui re seaman
status i n a Jones Act acti on.
(Gizoni

v.

Southwest Marine inc., CA9,

56 F. 3d 1 138, 617195)

Byron Gizoni (Gizoni),
shore-based rigger and
rigging foreman, was in
jured when he stepped
into a hole on the deck of
Southwest Marine Inc.'s
(Southwest's)
floating
pontoon barge or floating platform during
repair of a U.S. Navy ship. The pontoon
was secured to a floating dry dock being
used to repair the ship's rudder.
Southwest, Gizoni's employer, was sued
under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. app. § 688,
on the claim that Gizoni was a seaman be
cause of his work aboard the barges and
watercraft owned by Southwest Marine.
Although the Jones Act provides an in
jured seaman a cause of action in negli
gence, it does not define seaman for pur
poses of the Act.
The district court found Gizoni to be a
harbor worker and therefore precluded
from suing under the Act, granting South
west summary judgment. The court of ap
peals reversed. The appeals court found
that the lower court had erred in its in
structions to the jury on the definition of
"seaman." In its remand for a new trial,
the appeals court held: (I) that the fleet
doctrine instruction should have been
given; (2) evidence that Gizoni had been
employed on a vessel in navigation was
not misleading; (3) the court's instruction
defining a vessel was erroneous; but that
(4) the "permanent connection" instruc
tion was correct.
Gizoni, the ninth circuit noted, had to
show, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that he was a "seaman." According to the
Bullis test, to prove one is a seaman, he
must be (I) employed on a vessel that is in
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navigation; (2) permanently connected
to that vessel; and (3) contributing to
the function of the mission of the ves
sel. Bullis v. Twentieth Century-Fox
Film Corp., 474 F.2d 392, 393 (9th
Cir. 1 973).
Gizoni claimed that the district court
had erred by not instructing the jury on
the fleet sea doctrine. The fleet doc
trine, created by the fifth circuit to
lower the requirement that a seaman
had to be permanently assigned to a
vessel, allows one to acquire seaman
status through permanent assignment
among multiple vessels under one
common ownership. Campo v. Elec
tro-Coal Transfer Corp., 970 F.2d 5 1 ,
52 (5th Cir. 1 992), cert. denied, 1 1 3
S.Ct. 1 26 1 , 1 22 L.Ed.2d 659 ( 1 993).
The appellate court determined that the
fleet doctrine was a reasonable exten
sion of Jones Act precedent. The court
considered evidence that Gizoni had
worked on a variety of barges for
Southwest. The fleet doctrine was also
applicable, ironically, because South
west, in its closing argument, focussed
on the fact that Gizoni could not prove
that he was "more or less permanently
attached" to a particular barge. There
fore, the district court clearly erred in
not giving the instruction.
The district court, argued Gizoni, also
erred by instructing the jury that Gi
zoni had to prove that the situs of the
accident occurred on a vessel in navi
gation. Under the Jones Act, a seaman
may recover for any injury that oc
curred in the course of employment.
0 'Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge &
Dock Co., 3 1 8 U.S. 36, 63 S.Ct. 488,
87 L.Ed. 596 (1943). Thus, whether or
not the injury occurred on a vessel is
irrelevant. Yet, in contrast, the judge's
instruction to the jury implied Gizoni
had to establish that he was employed
on a vessel in navigation to recover.
Further, said Gizoni, the district court
clearly erred in instructing the jury
with the following: "If the transporta
tion function, if any, of the floating
platform was merely incidental to its
other functions, the floating platform
cannot be found to be a vessel. * * *
[T]o be a vessel, the purpose of the
floating platform must, to some rea
sonable degree, be the transportation
of passengers, cargo or equipment
from place to place across navigable

waters." Gizoni v. Southwest Marine Corp.,
56 F.3d 1 1 38, 1 1 42 (9th Cir. 1 995).
The court of appeals stated in previous de
cisions that unusual-looking craft, whose
purpose is not the transportation of persons
or things, can be considered vessels under
the Jones Act. Estate of Wenzel v. Seaward
Marine Services, 709 F.2d 1 326 (9th Cir.
1 983). Hence, the district court's instruc
tion regarding the transportation function
was also erroneous.
Finally, the plaintiff contended that, when
the district judge instructed the jury,
''[Gizoni] had to establish that he had a more
or less permanent connection with the vessel
*
*
* [,]" that this implied that he was re
quired to spend most of his time on that par
ticular barge. The appeals court did not find
this statement misleading. According to the
United States Supreme Court, "the key to
seaman status is employment-related con
nection to a vessel in navigation." McDer
mott Jnt'l v. Wilander, 498 U. S. 337, Il l
S.Ct. 807, 1 1 2 L.Ed.2d 866 ( 1 99 1 ).
The purpose of the connection requirement
is not intended to allow an individual who
works for an isolated period protection un
der the Jones Act, but to protect the seaman
who serves aboard one particular vessel for
a brief time. THOMAS 1. SCHOENBAUM, AD
MIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW § 6-9, at 263
(2d ed. 1 994).
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Collision
IYRR Y ACH TING REG ULATIONS
P REEMP T COLREG S
In yacht col li si on case, findi ngs of Inter
nati onal Jury p reemp t U. S. court's app li 
cati on of Arti cl es 12 & 13 of the Conven
ti on on Internati onal Regulati on for the
P reventi on
of
Colli si ons
at
Sea
( COLREG S).
(Juno SRL v. SIV Endeavour, CAl, 58
F.3d 1, 619195)

On October 3, 1 992, two vessels, the
and the Endeavour, were
racing in the La Nioulargue Regatta in and
around the Bay of St. Tropez. Although the
yachts were racing on separate courses, the
Charles Jourdan
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